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ABSTRACT
The article examines an article that Dirk Smit wrote about rhetoric and theology against the 
background of other of his articles, particularly about the Confession of Belhar. It argues 
that Smit’s article is “judiciously sceptical” about rhetoric because he is committed not only 
to faith, but also to the uncertainty of hope. This commitment is, it is argued, compatible 
with rhetoric, but only with a certain type of rhetoric. Such a hopeful rhetoric, which does 
not accept the closure of tragedy, reaches out to others across tragic divisions as the Confes-
sion of Belhar did. The final section examines how Smit’s article is itself a rhetorical act and 
tries to identify the particular appeal he makes on readers. 
The machinery of language is so made that, either rightly or wrongly, either grandly or in 
fragments, we stretch forth our hands through love of the farther shore.
(Burke 1966:200, adapted in part from Virgil)
The virTue of scepTicism; The vice of cynicism 
That Dirk Smit, whose ability to survey broad landscapes of theology never ceases to amaze, 
also wrote about “theology as rhetoric” (Smit 1996) is not very surprising; that he did so with 
erudition, insight and a hint of judicious scepticism is not surprising at all. Whereas erudition 
and insight are recognised scholarly virtues, it is seldom recognised that a degree of scepticism 
is a virtue in a Christian theologian. Christian faith, in its concrete scope, is dialectically related 
to equally concrete doubts that it permits, encourages and demands.1
Faith permits Christians to doubt, in an ordinary human way, whether the latest academic 
trend is really a gospel worthy of belief. It encourages them to be mindful of human frailty and 
thus to doubt whether even their own constructs are better than makeshifts. It demands of 
them that they severely doubt theories of such a mechanistic and deterministic cast that they 
apparently leave no room for God’s creative and redemptive acts.
Although he does not, to my knowledge, deal with the matter directly, Smit seems fully aware 
of the need for “Christian scepticism”. Drawing on the old image of a rhetorical performance 
as a feast or “dinner party”,2 he asks at the start whether his “divergent eating habits” as a 
Reformed dogmatikus will allow him to partake of the dishes set before him (1996:3-94). At 
the close he again asks whether he can really be party to the party or whether he should 
remain outside, “eating his crackers in his cabin” (1996:4-22). Question marks are found in his 
title, in his penultimate sentence, in all but one of the section headings and frequently in the 
1 This was frequently stressed by Chesterton and noted in passing by Burke (1935:107).
2 The image is at least as old as Plato (1931b:325; 1931a:431) and was a commonplace at least until the 
Renaissance (Jeanneret 1991:91ff.),
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rest of this article (indeed in many of his articles). The point is well taken: Who sets the menu 
and decides who eats whom? “Theology as rhetoric” might mean that the one digests and 
transforms the other. Smit is legitimately concerned lest Reformed theology be sacrificed to 
furnish the festive meal.
Scepsis is not cynicism. Sceptical questions await answers; cynical ones, by assuming that all 
answers are equally inadequate, conclude conversations in the style of Pilate. Smit (1996:421) 
rightly warns that a form of rhetorical criticism may become “a powerful cynical tool in a new 
cynical discourse”, an unmasking without an apocalypse.3 Smit’s reasons for rejecting cynicism 
are theological. He devotes several pages (1996:395ff.) to explaining why he cannot give up 
commitment and persuasion, why he cannot adopt the position of the neutral analyst. In this 
regard he mentions the Belhar Confession of which he was a co author (1996:396). Christian 
scepticism loses its warrant when it excludes the possibility of a confessional stance issuing in 
a substantive confession, one that has substance. While such a confession is rhetorical in that 
it speaks from commitment (being persuaded!) towards persuasion, it can have no truck with 
postmodern “rhetoricality” (cf. Bender and Wellbury 1990:25ff.) as a condition of permanent 
flux, which denies, as its first article of faith, any notion of substance.4 
To answer Smit’s questions about rhetoric systematically would require a book studded with 
further questions. Rhetoric, just like theology, can be defined in countless ways.5 Instead of 
this, I shall approach some of the questions obliquely, drawing on, among others, some of 
Smit’s other articles, particularly about the text and context of the Belhar Confession, and 
on Kenneth Burke, my mentor in these matters. In the final section I return to the article in 
question and make a stab at finding Smit’s own rhetorical strategy.
encompassing Tragedy: invigoraTing hope
Cheryl Exum (1992:15) quotes with approval Sewald’s view that the tragic vision is “not for 
those who cannot live with unsolved questions or unresolved doubts”. This may hold for 
observers; virtually the opposite is true of protagonists. Much tragedy ensues from our failure 
to attain our purposes, yet we are virtually always able to ensure tragic endings. Unable to 
unravel the tangle of our lives, we bring matters to a close through literal or figurative suicide 
or homicide, thus determining our destiny by a process of termination. Closure comes, as it 
were, naturally in literary tragedies: they conclude because virtually all the main characters 
3 A hermeneutics of suspicion can be virtuously sceptical or viciously cynical. Burke frequently warns 
against the cynical variant, which he calls debunking (1952:97, 407; 1955a:36, 66f., 74, 93, 165, 256, 
338): it approaches positivism, it is either anti social or limited to the group, it is dangerous to the 
character of the debunker.
4 In this vein Vorster (1999:287f.) objects to the “objectivism and foundationalism” (he conflates the two) 
that he still detects in biblical rhetorical critics with their focus on the ancient text. They might insist that 
one should first know “as well as possible” the language to read “the original text”, the literary codes 
(genres) and rhetorical practices of that time and society, and the whole corpus (of the Bible). Then one 
has to get to know the history of the language and the society, and the theological and rhetorical traditions, 
in brief, the historical context. Finally, one has to assess “probabilistically” what the author meant to say 
and how the author was heard. All this comes from that notorious foundationalist Derrida (1988:144), 
telling us how we should begin to read Rousseau (I put “theological” for “philosophical”).
5 One possibility that I reject is simply to rejoice in the proliferation of discourses about rhetoric. I am not 
convinced that Wuellner (1989) avoids this and find his account diffuse. Nor do I find a slavish copying of 
the classical terminology helpful.
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are dead.
A dual reading of the tragic eventuality is usually possible. The grammar of tragedy speaks 
of inevitability, of vast internal or external forces foreclosing on the plans and ideals of the 
human actors. The sheer imbalance – the human against the cosmic (cf. Burke 1955a:42; Exum 
1992:11) – lends grandeur to tragic heroes, who, by the grammar of tragedy, lose only because 
victory was humanly impossible. Precisely this frequently permits a rhetoric of tragedy in 
which the emphasis falls on supreme and defiant human action. Thus those who feel, rightly 
or wrongly, that they are bereft of other significant power may affirm their “agency” and the 
importance of their lives by manufacturing tragedy. “I am the captain of my soul” – and I prove 
it by steering the ship on the rocks. Shooting people at random in a public place is arguably the 
easiest and surest way to make it to the headlines. Simultaneously the assumption is invited 
that such extreme measures imply an extreme motivation: the tragic occludes the trivial. By 
shuttling between these two readings, one can encompass (embrace) tragedy6 and aver that 
one is encompassed by it, thus reaping the benefits of tragic “magnification” (Burke 1955a:43) 
and victimhood simultaneously.
Hope too allows for a double reading. Uncertainty belongs to its grammar,7 but in Christian 
rhetoric hope, being linked to faith, is an expression of a firm conviction. Grammatically, what 
one hopes for lies beyond one’s absolute control: something or someone else can frustrate or 
realise one’s hopes. In this sense, hope implies the openness of the future.8 If, however, one 
affirms that the future is in God’s hands, hope is firmly anchored in God’s חסד, unpredictable in 
form, but unchanging in substance. Here too a double benefit accrues. No present “certainty”, 
however grim, can trump the uncertainty of hope, yet, since the unknown future belongs to 
God, not fate, hope offers remarkable security. When I “hope that”, uncertainty prevails; when 
I “place my hope in” someone trustworthy, I am secured by the other. Hope, which invigorates 
us in the face of adversity, is itself invigorated by trust. Whereas tragedy isolates (cf. Exum 
1992:11), Christian hope lives from and towards community.
The Belhar Confession could have been a statement of heroic resignation in the tragic mode, 
a dramatic act of symbolic homicide directed at the apparently all powerful enemy, although 
it would then not have been a confession of Christian faith. When Synod decided that the 
Accompanying Letter should always be published with the Confession, it removed possible 
doubts in this regard, as Smit (2007c:157) recognises. The Accompanying Letter reaches 
forward, confronting the apparent certainties of the present with the openness of God’s 
future. Equally clearly, the letter, by reaching out to the “enemy”,9 refuses to accept division as a 
predetermined cosmic reality (an order of creation). Finding itself in a de facto order of division 
and ordered to accept this “reality”, URCSA appealed – to a higher Judge and its human critics. 
If the Confession in itself was faithful rhetoric, the appending of the letter made it eminently 
hopeful rhetoric, a rejection of tragic closure.
6 I agree with those who believe that Judaism and Christianity exclude a tragic view of the world. Cf. 
Lawrie (2011, particularly n7) to which may be added the view of Jaspers (quoted in Glicksberg 
1963:36ff.).
7 Wittgenstein (1968:129) says something like this about wishing and expecting; it clearly applies to hoping 
as well.
8 Thus hope does not eliminate suffering. Cilliers (2007:394ff.) rightly regards lament as part of the 
language of hope.
9 Thus Smit (2007c:163, 165) says that the letter is “almost like an outstretched hand”; it speaks 
“pleadingly”.
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appealing rheToric; rheTorical appeal
Smit (1996:398ff.) says that, precisely as a Christian theologian, he would want to speak 
persuasively; he also knows that power enters into rhetorical transactions (1996:396f.). Ideally, 
perhaps, rhetoric persuades an audience, yet audiences may be swayed, if not fully persuaded, 
by many factors. Both a gun held to one’s head and the offer of a bribe are powerfully 
“persuasive”; so are their rhetorical equivalents. Thus rhetoric can be most appealing precisely 
when it is least rhetorical, least dependent on verbal performance. But there is a curious 
dialectic of strength and weakness in the rhetoric of power. When I flaunt my power rhetorically 
to attain my ends, I acknowledge my weakness – I cannot attain my ends and secure my power 
without the co operation of others. Often simply exercising my power would defeat my ends 
and end my power. Conversely, when I play on the weakness of another, I have to assume that 
the particular weakness, say greed, is strong enough for my purpose.10 Rhetoric, even at its 
most corrupt, depends on co operation and embodies an appeal.
What one must ultimately make of “theology as rhetoric” is anybody’s guess, for, as Burke 
(1952:503f ) pointed out, “X as Y” is the formula of metaphor and metaphor embodies one 
perspective without excluding others. In some ways theology can usefully be seen as rhetoric; 
in other ways not.11 Is it ever useful to see rhetoric as theology? Kenneth Burke sometimes 
comes close to saying this, without, I believe, simply replacing “God” with “language” as some 
postmodern theorists tend to do.
When Burke (1970:1) notes the close relationship between “theology” as “words about God” 
and “logology” (his coinage) as “words about words” and later draws seven analogies between 
“words” and “the Word” (1970:7- 34), it seems as if theology is reduced to logology. But still later 
he adds that “logology fails to offer grounds for the perfection of promises and threats that 
theology allows for” (1970:300). Moreover, language as symbolic action (not mere motion) 
always contains a creative moment that cannot be encompassed in a science of cause and 
effect.12 In as much as language is meaningful, it is imbued with purpose, for meaning is an 
attenuation of purpose (1952:290f.). As creative, purposeful act, language always involves a 
form of transcendence, a reaching out (as in the quotation at the top of the article). Although 
the reaching out can be misguided and trivial and the transcendence “downwards”, language 
always and by its nature aims beyond itself (cf. 1952:420ff.): this is one reason why Burke 
retains a notion of God (1955b:178f., 290f.). Also, since human language is rooted in the 
“hortatory no”, language “ethicises” and introduces hierarchy (1966:9 -16, 359 -378, 419 -436). 
Finally, rhetoric – the use of language “to induce cooperation” (1955b:43) – both assumes and 
creates community: its aim is identification in which people become consubstantial with one 
another (1955b:19ff. and passim).
This is a sketchy account, but adding a little more would not help much, for Burke is nothing 
if not convoluted. He has, however, persuaded me that when one views language as symbolic 
action, questions appear that are entirely overlooked in both structuralism and post-
structuralism. These questions can only be dealt with in theology or in metaphysics, which 
Burke regards as coy theology (1970:300). Burke himself remained coy, arguably because 
10 This is the point that Socrates successfully establishes against Callicles (Plato 1931a:369ff.).
11 The metaphor is a useful reminder that theology does not describe a state of affairs “out there” or inside 
the believer, but is always an appeal, a reaching out.
12 Burke often harks back to the distinction between action and motion (1952:59ff.; 1966:53, 63; 
1978:32f.).
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he could not muster the hope (rather than faith or love) for which his insights made ample 
allowance.
consTrucTing audiences; consTrucTed audiences 
As Smit (1996:419) notes, the construction of the audience is a live issue in current rhetorical 
debates. Perelman set the ball rolling when he pointed out that “the rhetorical audience” is 
always a construction of the rhetorician. Arguments and appeals that are not ad hominem 
beg the question (cf. Perelman 1982:21ff.). The subtext here is frequently overlooked. The 
rhetorical audience is, to be sure, a symbolic construction, yet if the construction is not a 
reasonably accurate reflection of the real audience, the rhetorical act will fail. Thus, one has 
to be a good listener in order to be a good speaker or writer. Others shifted the emphasis to 
how audiences are constructed (called into being, interpellated) by the dominant rhetoric. 
“Audience construction” gained a sinister ring, because powerful rhetoric and the rhetoric 
of power could amount to an imposition. We convince others by making them convicts, 
incarcerated in discourses that deter mine what should count as “meaning”.
At roughly the same time, it became fashionable to say that audiences construct the meaning 
of texts, which have no authority to impose any particular meaning. It is sometimes added that 
these constructing audiences were themselves constructed by interpretive communities. This 
leads to the final permutation, in which audiences, texts and everything else are constructions, 
reconstructed and deconstructed in an ineluctable, opaque process. Indeed, it is hard to 
say what constructs what, for subjects and objects disappear in the all that may be called, 
apparently without significant difference, rhetoric, text, context, writing, discourse, ideology 
or interpretation. The subtle juggle the balls expertly; the epigones, when they are not trivially 
incoherent, often suggest, with an unconvincing nod at Nietzsche’s amor fati, that one simply 
has to keep abreast of the times – whatever is, is good.13 This provides fertile soil for cynicism 
to flourish, though few would admit to being cynics.
Versions of the last three views remain common, often in bewildering combinations. Thus it is 
sometimes said that in theory audiences do “make meaning”, free from the dead hand of the 
text, and that in practice audiences are putty in the hands of ideology, therefore we should 
take responsibility for our rhetoric, thereby willingly binding ourselves to … what? The first 
view has all but dis appeared, yet it seems to be the only truly hopeful one. It recognises the 
appeal of rhetoric and the dialectic of strength and weakness implied by it. It makes no claims 
to certainty, but it locates the uncertainty in the everyday play of human interaction rather 
than the distant play of signifiers. Thus it is also the only view that features what we normally 
call “human society”, the society in which we grope somewhat blindly for one another – to 
strangle and rob and also to embrace and caress.14 It acknowledges that we often construct 
others and are constructed by them in constricting ways, but adds that construction can 
sometimes also imply edification. It is such an all too human rhetoric that I advocate, also for 
theologians (cf. also Smit 2007b:151).
Yet rhetoric as humanistic discourse (cf. Hunt 1984:13ff.) cannot be the last word for theologians 
13 Thus I am not surprised to find Vorster saying: “these turns insist that …” (1999: 294) and “language acts 
…” (1999:308).
14 I have previously argued that gainsaying, going up against someone, may end in consensus, in each 
saying again what the other had said (Lawrie 2001:414). The transition between fighting and friendship is 
dramatised effectively in the combat between Gilgamesh and Enkidu.
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(cf. Smit 2007b:153). The other views have something to say about human bondage (view 2), 
about creativity and responsibility (view 3) and about the beyond of our acts (view 4). I suggest 
that theology, in speaking openly about sin, ethics and God, may deal with these aspects 
more clearly and directly than any rhetorical theory can.15 In Burke’s terms, Christian theology 
has a more rounded terminology, one which includes rhetoric without simply passing into 
it. Rhetoric has been used to dominate; so have ethics and theology (cf. Smit 2007a), for sin 
always gets its word in. Nevertheless, God is the Word and God’s is the first and last word. This 
is our “uncertain” security, which allows and bids us to reach out in appeal, mustering what 
creativity and responsibility we have, neither arrogantly nor unduly abashed.
guess who’s being served for dinner 
Smit (1996:422, citing Alves) ends his article by referring to Ghandi, who “ate crackers in his 
cabin” because he feared being marginalised at a table where different rules prevailed. Some 
Indians might have done the same for a different reason: a Brahmin might refuse to dine with 
people from outside his caste for fear of contamination. Although Ghandi personally shared 
a table with all sorts of people, he wrote that he did not consider refusal to eat with someone 
from another group a sin (Shirer 1982:118). So, two very different attitudes can lie behind the 
hesitation to join the rhetorical feast; that of the marginalised out sider or that of the aloof 
Brahmin.
Smit is committed to Christian witness and also wants (sometimes) to speak in the Name 
of God. Whence then his hesitation? Can public theology as witness, confession and 
proclamation (kerugma) shun the forum, given that all these words are forensic in the broader 
or narrower sense? I suggest that the hesitation is itself rhetorical, Smit’s way of entering 
the forum discreetly. For long some churches and theologians in South Africa specialised 
in authoritative, dogmatic pronouncements, often in the service of political power brokers. 
These pronouncements, quite apart from their gross insensitivity to marginalised outsiders, 
presented a closed case, leaving no room for the uncertainty of hope and God’s future. The 
rhetoric spoke of a status quo of enclosed spaces, group areas, in which the purity of the 
Brahmin was ensured at a tragic cost for others. Yet, none knows better than Smit that the 
marginalised did take a stand, opposing to the status quo a status confessionis and saying 
authoritatively: “Jesus is Lord.” When early Christians said this in the forum, their witness could 
make them martyrs, for some saw it as a confession of guilt. Some were served for dinner – to 
the lions – because they chose to serve their Lord rather than the emperor.
Perhaps, as Smit (2008:178f.) suggests regarding Barth, Christians are postmodern in that they 
reject the subject -object split. Though the danger of subjecting and objectifying others is real, 
I remain sceptical: the distinction between subject and object is entrenched in language. In 
another respect Christians cannot but be outsiders at the postmodern feast. Sooner or later, 
Christians have to take a stand and speak the dreaded words arche (of origin and authority), 
telos and Substance (for God, though more than the Substance of philosophers, is not less). 
They do so as humans among others in the milling forum, from within the flux of human 
language. If they refuse to resign themselves to the inevitability of flux, it is not because they 
have an Archimedean point beneath their feet, but because they are stretching forth their 
15 In particular, theology does not have to make abstractions (power, ideology, discourse, et cetera), 
perform all sorts of unlikely actions. Wartenberg (1990:138f.) rightly sees this as a “fundamental flaw”, a 
streak of mysticism, in Foucault.
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necks (cf. Rom. 8:23) in hope towards the One who called and promised. For this they may 
have their necks stretched or cut through.
We probably still have no better guide to Christian rhetoric in this situation than the 
one provided by Paul in 2 Corinthians 3 6 and few better recent examples than the Belhar 
Confession (read with the Accompanying Letter). But did the latter persuade? To this day, 
the hands stretched forth in love have not been grasped by those to whom the appeal was 
primarily made. Even within URCSA the Confession often functions as a treasured possession, 
a relic to muster the community of faith, a paradigmatic grammatical exercise in the language 
of the group. Sadly, few necks from either side are stuck out today. Should we wistfully accept 
that “after Babel” our languages are inevitably and tragically confused and that eating our 
crackers in our cabins is the best we can do, thereby returning very precisely to what the Dutch 
Reformed Church had said years ago?
Smit’s hesitation, his virtuous scepticism, requires careful reading: he voices his doubts about 
entering a certain forum at that very forum. Smit the dogmatikus is also Smit the practical, 
wily rhetorician. First, Smit 1 stands squarely before us, vulnerable, somewhat nervous, even 
slightly naive. Next we are confronted by a series of tricky questions emanating from Smit 2, 
whose own position is not apparent. We have to fight it out with the spirits we have called 
(Wuellner, Schüssler Fiorenza, Foucault, and others) and that are now creating pandemonium 
in our ranks, those we thought we had swallowed and are now swallowing us. Rhetorical 
theorists, eager to include in the realm of rhetoric all disciplines, theology included, have not 
even arrived at consensus as to what rhetoric is and does! What concern is this of a dogmatikus?
It took me several readings to locate Smit 3 in the margins of the text, in the questions 
behind the questions, in the order of the presentation. He stands where he has always stood, 
humbly confident and never far from the Reformed tradition expressed so clearly in the Belhar 
Confession. Since the relative invisibility of Smit 3 in the article implies no theological shift, I 
take it to be a rhetorical move. He could, in the style of the Confession, have taken his stand 
both positively and in opposition to those rhetorical views that he would have to reject. He 
could have concluded with an explicitly appealing “accompanying letter”. Instead (as Smit 2), 
he directs his questions from all angles, leaving his audience to do the triangulation. Those 
who finally find him beyond the questions will meet someone very like Smit 1, but much less 
easy to dismiss casually. In this powerful statement lurks a powerful appeal – the appeal of the 
elusive, which reaches out by enticing others to reach out. Should those who fret about the 
rhetorical abuse of power complain that this is too subtle, are they not admitting that they 
respond only to forceful rhetoric?
Clearly much depends on who is being served for dinner. That rhetoric always explicitly or 
implicitly stands in the service of someone or something is a correct insight, not a new or 
profound one. A theory or method that told us unfailingly who is served by what rhetorical 
act would be profound – or perhaps merely positivistic. I’d say “rhetorical criticism is itself a 
rhetorical act”16 and leave it at that. But I also recognise that in rhetorical acts people can get 
16 This amounts to the “rhetorical full turn” that Schüssler Fiorenza (1996:36) calls for, but it includes 
the warning that the “posture of scientific certainty” (1996:52) can invade ideological criticism and the 
hermeneutics of suspicion as well. The subsequent debate (Combrink 1999:29, Robbins 2002, Schüssler 
Fiorenza 2005, for instance) was sad rather than edifying. Without singling out persons, I append these 
remarks: Rhetoric invariably has an oppositional or adversarial aspect, but responsible rhetoric does not 
present a closed case: it appeals to the uncertainty of hope. The former is seen in the Belhar Confession, 
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eaten alive. Among peers this seldom matters much: those who take a bite out of you often 
incorporate something of your view and become to an extent consubstantial with you. What, 
though, of those who cannot, as academics obviously can, bite back? Should (and can) we 
save them from the voracious by incorporating them ourselves and then (re)presenting them, 
suitably digested, as items on the menu at our symposia?
It seems to me that the Bible (not rhetoric or hermeneutics) tells me that I should go as a 
lamb (not a plenipotentiary) among the wolves, as prey among predators. I seldom manage 
to serve God by serving myself up in this way. Dirk Smit has reminded me that Jesus provided 
the lambs with advice about protecting themselves: they should be innocent as the dogmatici 
and wily as the rhetoricians! Above all – this is built into the entire structure of the Bible – they 
should go in the uncertainty and security of hope – after Pentecost – reaching out in love 
because God’s love reached them first.
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